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Bayesian estimationShocks affecting the rate at which investment goods are transformed into capital stock have been identiﬁed as a
major driver of the business cycle. Such shocks have been linked to frictions in ﬁnancial markets, because ﬁnancial
markets are instrumental in transforming consumption goods into installed capital. Yet we show that the impor-
tance of these investment shocks is greatly diminished when collateral constraints on ﬁrms are introduced into
an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In the presence of binding collateral constraints, risk
premium shocks take on amore prominent role as drivers of the business cycle. Modellers of business cycle ﬂuctu-
ations need to bemindful of the incompatibility of investment shocks and collateral constraints and of the difﬁculty
in specifying ‘structural’ shocks that are robust to modest amendments to the frictions present in a model.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Do shocks to investment drive the business cycle? A number of pa-
pers over the last decade suggest that investment shocks account for
the majority of the variation in key macroeconomic aggregates.1 The
role of investment shocks has also come into renewed focus following
the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Financial intermediation affects the transfor-
mation of savings into usable, installed capital. Likewise, investment
shocks affect the economy's ability to transform consumption goods
into productive capital and thus play a parallel role to the process of ﬁ-
nancial intermediation. Justiniano et al. (2011), for example, draw an
explicit link between shocks to the marginal efﬁciency of investment
and credit risk spreads. Credit spreads imply the existence of a material
ﬁnancial friction, yet the model in Justiniano et al. (2011) has no such
friction.their helpful comments.We are
data, and Roberta Cardani and
was written while Christoph
f New Zealand. The generous ﬁ-
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niversity of Shefﬁeld, 9 Mappin
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r evidence from structural vec-
r DSGE based evidence. For an
. This is an open access article underOur principal aim in this paper is to investigate the role and trans-
mission mechanism of investment shocks in the presence of ﬁnancial
frictions. More speciﬁcally, we introduce a collateral constraint, similar
to that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Gerali et al. (2010), into the
model of Smets and Wouters (2007).
Using a data set that extends from 1954Q3 through to 2011Q4 for
the United States (US), we estimate our amended model and compute
the contribution of structural shocks to the cyclical variation of output,
investment, consumption, and so on. We demonstrate that the intro-
duction of ﬁnancial frictions in the form of a collateral constraint mate-
rially alterswhich shocks are thought to be themost important drivers of
the business cycle. The intuition behind our result is simple: a positive in-
vestment shock lowers the relative price of capital goods, Tobin's q, and
leads to an investment boom. However, when entrepreneurs are subject
to binding collateral constraints, a reduction in the value of installed cap-
ital reduces the value of collateral and thus the amount an entrepreneur
can borrow. As a result, the initial response of investment to a positive in-
vestment shock is attenuated by the decline in available credit. In the
presence of a collateral constraint, however, the increase in investment
cannot be ﬁnanced via increased borrowing and is therefore accompa-
nied by a decline in entrepreneurial consumption. Consequently, invest-
ment shocks struggle to generate the positive correlation between
consumption and investment that is observed in the data.
In ourmodel, the shock affecting the cost of borrowing – the risk pre-
mium or consumption shock – is amajor driver of cyclical ﬂuctuations in
output and other macroeconomic variables. This risk premium shock ac-
counts for around half of the variation in output and consumption, and
40% of the variation in investment and interest rates. There is also athe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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US business cycle.2 The collateral constraint also has a material effect on
the transmission of risk premium shocks. Contrary to the transmission
mechanismof investment shocks described above, a stimulatory risk pre-
mium shock causes demand to rise and Tobin's q to increase. This implies
that entrepreneurs face a looser borrowing constraint, and thus the im-
pact of the risk premium shock is ampliﬁed for both consumption and
investment.
Like us, Christiano et al. (2011) and Christiano et al. (2014) observe
that the contribution of IST shocks to the variance of GDP is diminished
when a ﬁnancial friction is introduced into the model. Our work differs
from those papers in two main respects. First, we have a collateral
constraint rather than an external ﬁnance premiumas ourﬁnancial fric-
tion. Second, in the above papers the IST shock remains an important
driver of GDP dynamics except when ﬁnancial variables are included
as observables, whereas in our model – even with just the standard
Smets–Wouters observables – the contribution of the IST shock to cycli-
cal dynamics is largely annihilated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 out-
lines the model used in the analysis. The model closely follows that
of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano et al. (2010), but we add
impatient entrepreneurs who are collateral constrained. Section 3
discusses the estimation of the model. Section 4 looks at the role of in-
vestment speciﬁc technology (IST) and risk premium shocks as cyclical
drivers.3 In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss the results of our paper and
their robustness.
2. Model
Ourmodel is based on the familiarNewKeynesianmodel put forward
by Smets andWouters (2007). Households consume (and save) and sup-
ply labour. The household income that underpins consumption and
saving is obtained fromwages, and from dividend streams from owning
the ﬁrms that produce ﬁnal goods. Households smooth consumption
over time by investing in deposits issued by competitive ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries. The model has various nominal and real frictions including
price andwage rigidities (with backward inﬂation indexation), habit for-
mation in consumption, and adjustment costs for investment. Themodel
also has variable capital utilization and ﬁxed costs.
We modify the baseline Smets–Wouters model by introducing
entrepreneurial agents who are subject to a borrowing constraint.4
Introducing an additional agent into the model provides scope for bor-
rowing and lending in the steady state. We assume that borrowing is
limited to a fraction χ of the present value of the future capital stock
owned by the entrepreneur. Mendoza (2006) provides a general speci-
ﬁcation for collateral constraints nesting the one employed in our paper.
Our approach is similar to the ‘margin constraint’ in Aiyagari andGertler
(1999), which hinges on the value of capital owned. Debt is one-period,
so the stock of capital ﬁnanced by household lending to the entrepre-
neurs needs to be re-ﬁnanced each period.
We adopt a borrowing constraint because it is a parsimonious ﬁnan-
cial friction, and has a pedigree in theoretical models dating back to at
least Kiyotaki andMoore (1997). Furthermore, empirical evidence indi-
cates that collateralization of debt is ubiquitous (see for example Berger
and Udell, 1990; Harhoff and Korting, 1998; Jimenez et al., 2006);
collateral requirements are consistent with the notion that entrepre-
neurs' borrowing capacity is constrained by the value of their assets.2 See Fig. 2.
3 We refer to investment speciﬁc technology shocks in the spirit of Smets andWouters
(2007). Other authors (such as Justiniano et al., 2011) make a distinction between IST
shocks, which affect the transformation of consumption goods into investment, and
shocks to themarginal efﬁciency of investment (MEI shocks),which affect the transforma-
tion of investment into productive capital.
4 Lombardo and McAdam (2012) also introduce borrowing constraints into the Smets-
Wouters model, but in their model, the constraint binds for households, while ﬁrms are
subject to costly state veriﬁcation.Entrepreneurs are responsible for all investment. We assume that
entrepreneurs have a higher rate of time preference than households
and are therefore more impatient. The entrepreneurs' impatience
causes the collateral constraint to be binding even in steady state, unlike
Mendoza (2008). Entrepreneurial impatiencemeans that entrepreneurs
can beneﬁcially exchange current consumption for future consumption
by borrowing from households. This intertemporal substitution is
enabled by investment in capital goods. All agents, both households
and entrepreneurs, are subject to the same stochastic shocks, and thus
there is no idiosyncratic risk to insure away. As discussed by Iacoviello
(2005), the return to investment exceeds the return to savings so that
the collateral constraint is binding, but we do not want entrepreneurs
to postpone consumption to self-fund all of the desired investment,
which is prevented by the entrepreneur's impatience.
Entrepreneurs are the agents who own the capital stock. They ﬁ-
nance consumption and investment expenditure by renting out capital
goods to ﬁnal goods producers and through borrowing from house-
holds, via notional ﬁnancial intermediaries.
In our description of the model below, we limit our discussion to
those parts of the model that differ from Smets and Wouters (2007),
focusing on the decision problems of households and entrepreneurs.
A full set of linearized model equations is presented in Appendix A.
2.1. Households
The representative household maximizes the following utility
function:
Et
X∞
s¼0
βs
1
1−σ c
C j;tþs−hCt−1þs
 1−σ c exp σ c−1
1þ σ l
L1þσ lj;tþs
  
ð1Þ
subject to
C j;t þ
Bj;t
Pt
¼ Π j;t þW j;tL j;t þ
Rft−1
πt
B j;t−1
Pt−1
: ð2Þ
The jth household maximizes utility by choosing consumption at
time t, Cj,t, and hours worked Lj,t. β is the discount factor; h dictates
the degree of habit persistence; σl is the elasticity of substitution with
respect to the real wage; and σc in conjunction with the habit term de-
termines the intertemporal substitution elasticity for households. The
ﬂow constraint has consumption and real deposits (Bj,t/Pt) equal to
proﬁts,Πj,t, labour income (real wagesWj,tmultiplied by hoursworked)
and the value of real deposits from last period scaled up by the gross
effective nominal interest rate Rt − 1f divided by the gross inﬂation
rate, πt. The gross effective nominal interest rate is deﬁned as Rtf ≡ Rtεc,t
where εc,t is a risk premium shock, as in Smets and Wouters (2007),
and Rt is the gross risk free policy rate.
The household's ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and deposits
are summarized by the following equations. Themarginal utility of con-
sumption at time t, denoted λt, is:
λ j;t ¼ exp
σ c−1
1þ σ l
L1þσ lj;t
 
C j;t−hCt−1
 −σ c : ð3Þ
The Euler equation for households can then be represented as:
λ j;t ¼ βEt λ j;tþ1
Rft
πtþ1
 !
: ð4Þ
The savings, or deposits of the household, Bt/Pt, are lent to entrepre-
neurs, who use these funds to purchase capital goods. These capital
goods are rented out to ﬁnal goods-producing ﬁrms (which are in
turn owned by the households).
5 The ﬂexible price allocation used to construct the output gap is not affected by either
εr,t, εp,t or εw,t.
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The representative entrepreneur maximizes the expected utility:
Et
X∞
s¼0
βse
1
1−σe
Cej;tþs−heC
e
t−1þs
 	1−σ e  ð5Þ
where Ce denotes entrepreneurial consumption. Entrepreneurs are
subject to the following budget constraint:
Cej;t þ QtK j;t ¼
Bj;t
Pt
−
Rft−1
πt
B j;t−1
Pt−1
þ Rkt ZtK j;t−1−a Ztð ÞK j;t−1
þQt 1−δð ÞK j;t−1 þΠet :
ð6Þ
In each period, the entrepreneur purchases consumption goods
Cj,t
e and new capital stock, Kj,t, at price Qt. These purchases are ﬁnanced
by net borrowing fromhouseholds (B j;tPt −
R ft−1
πt
B j;t−1
Pt−1
), rental income on cap-
ital goods net of capital utilization costs (RtkZtKj,t − 1− a(Zt)Kj,t − 1), the
proceeds from selling last period's capital stock net of depreciation
(Qt(1− δ)Kj,t− 1), and proﬁt from the intermediate production of capital
(Πte). Because entrepreneurs are more impatient than households, they
face the following borrowing constraint on their degree of leverage:
Rft
πtþ1
Bj;t
Pt
¼ χEtQtþ1K j;t ð7Þ
where χ is the loan-to-value ratio (LVR), which dictates the maximum
permissible leverage ratio. This constraint is on the future value of capi-
tal, hence EtQt + 1, because any default and required loan recovery will
occur in the future. Because of the assumption that β N βe, the constraint
is always binding in the neighbourhood of the steady state.
The optimality conditions for the entrepreneur's consumption, bor-
rowing, capital purchases, and capital utilization are as follows:
Cej;t−heC
e
t−1
 	−σe
−λej;t ¼ 0 ð8Þ
λej;t−βeEtλ
e
j;tþ1
Rft
πtþ1
−λBj;t
R ft
πtþ1
¼ 0 ð9Þ
Qt ¼
λBj;t
λej;t
χQtþ1 þ βeEt
λej;tþ1
λej;t
Rktþ1Ztþ1−a Ztþ1ð Þ þ Qtþ1 1−δð Þ
h i
ð10Þ
Rkt ¼ a0 Ztð Þ ð11Þ
where λe and λB are the Lagrangemultipliers on theﬂow and borrowing
constraints respectively, Rtk is the return on capital and Zt is capital
utilization.
The presence of λB in the ﬁrst order conditions represents the effects
of the borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs' allocation of consump-
tion and capital purchases. Consider, for example, a case where the bor-
rowing constraint is exogenously relaxed. This results in a decline in the
shadow value of the constraint, λB. For constant real interest rates, the
Euler equation suggests that a looser borrowing constraint would be as-
sociated with higher consumption. Likewise, for a constant path of the
effective interest rate, a looser borrowing constraint implies a higher
value of installed capital, Q, and thus higher investment.
2.2.1. Capital producers
The capital stock is produced by ﬁrms, wholly owned by the entre-
preneurs. The jth representative capital-producing ﬁrm maximizes the
following proﬁt function:
Et
X∞
s¼0
Λetþs QtþsΔxj;tþs−I j;tþs

  ð12Þwhere Λte is the stochastic discount factor of the owner, in this case the
entrepreneur, and net capital accumulation is deﬁned as:
Δxj;t ¼ K j;t− 1−δð ÞK j;t−1 ¼ εμ;t 1−S I j;t ; I j;t−1
  
I j;t ð13Þ
where δ is the depreciation rate, εμ,t is an investment-speciﬁc shock, and
the function S(Ij,t, Ij,t − 1))Ij,t captures investment adjustment costs. The
investment adjustment cost function is quadratic in the ratio of invest-
ment to its lag. Substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (12) yields:
Et
X∞
s¼0
Λetþs Qtþsεμ;tþs 1−S I j;tþs; I j;tþs−1
  
I j;tþs−I j;tþs

 
: ð14Þ
Assuming that the adjustment cost function S(Ij,t, Ij,t − 1) takes the
form κ2

I j;t
I j;t−1
−γ
	2
, where γ is the gross steady state growth rate of
the economy, the optimality condition for investment is given by:
1 ¼ Qtεμ;t 1−
κ
2
I j;t
I j;t−1
−γ
 2 !
−κ
I j;t
I j;t−1
−γ
 
I j;t
I j;t−1
" #
þ βeEt
λetþ1
λet
Qtþ1εμ;tþ1 κ
I j;tþ1
I j;t
−γ
 
I j;tþ1
I j;t
 2" #
:
ð15Þ
Adjustment costs dampen the response of investment to various
shocks and play an important role in the dynamics of Tobin's q — the
relative price of ﬁrms' collateral in our model.
2.3. The rest of the model
The rest of the model directly follows Smets and Wouters (2007)
and thus we only provide a very brief description. A complete set of
linearized model equations is presented in Table 8 in Appendix A.
Output of ﬁnal goods is a function of effective capital, labour and
technology. Final goods producers rent capital services with a given
degree of utilization from entrepreneurs, and labour services from
household unions.
Goods and labour markets are monopolistically competitive with
both prices andwages being set in a time-dependentmanner as put for-
ward by Calvo (1983), albeit with partial indexation to past inﬂation for
those price and wage setters not called upon to re-price in a given time
period.
Government spending is simply modelled as a stochastic share of
GDP. Monetary policy is modelled by a generalized Taylor-type in-
terest rate rule that links the current period policy rate to its lag,
to deviations of the current period inﬂation rate from target, to de-
viations in the output gap, and to changes in the growth rate of the out-
put gap.
The output gap is deﬁned as the difference between output in
the sticky price allocation of the model and output corresponding to a
ﬂexible price allocation. In the ﬂexible price allocation there are no
nominal rigidities in either price or wage setting, and hence there is
no role for monetary policy.
2.4. Shocks
There are seven shocks perturbing the economy. The risk premium
(εc,t) and investment speciﬁc technology shock (εμ ,t), discussed above,
are augmented with shocks to total factor productivity (εa,t), the share
of government spending in GDP (εg,t), the interest rate rule (εr,t), and
shocks to the price andwage Phillips curves (εp,t and εw,t).5 These shocks
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equations:
εc;t ¼ ρcεc;t−1 þ ζ c;t ð16Þ
εμ;t ¼ ρμεμ;t−1 þ ζμ;t ð17Þ
εa;t ¼ ρaεa;t−1 þ ζa;t ð18Þ
εg;t ¼ ρgεg;t−1 þ ζg;t þ ρ g;að Þζa;t ð19Þ
εr;t ¼ ρrεr;t−1 þ ζ r;t ð20Þ
εp;t ¼ ρpεp;t−1 þ ζp;t−ρ p;ζð Þζp;t−1 ð21Þ
εw;t ¼ ρwεw;t−1 þ ζw;t−ρ w;ζð Þζw;t−1: ð22Þ
The various autoregressive and moving average (MA) coefﬁcients
are represented by ρ. Following Smets andWouters (2007), we include
a feedback term between the innovation in technology and government
spending, ρ(g,a), in the shock term for exogenous government spending,
as well as MA terms in the price and wage shocks to capture high fre-
quency ﬂuctuations in price and wage dynamics. The innovations ζj,t
are normal, independent and identically distributed.Table 1
Estimation results for parameters and shock processes of model with borrowing constraints: 1
Parameter Description Prior
α Share of capital N
ϕ Investment adjustment cost parameter N
σc Households intertemporal elasticity N
σcE Entrepreneur's intertemporal elasticity N
h habit parameter of consumers β
hE habit parameter of entrepreneurs β
θw Calvo wage parameter β
σl Labour disutility parameter Γ
θp Calvo price parameter β
ξ Capacity utilization parameter β
ϕp Markup (goods) N
δw Wage indexation β
δp Price indexation β
ϕπ Taylor rule inﬂation N
ϕr Taylor rule lagged interest rate β
ϕx Taylor rule output gap N
ϕΔx Taylor rule output gap growth rate N
π Steady state inﬂation Γ
100ð1−βÞ
β
Discount rate (percent) Γ
ltv Loan to value ratio β
~β Entrepreneurs discount less households Γ
lss Log steady state hours N
γ Steady state growth rate (percent) N
ρa AR parameter technology shock β
ρc AR parameter risk premium shock β
ρg AR parameter exogenous demand shock β
ρi AR parameter investment shock β
ρr AR parameter interest rate β
ρp AR parameter price markup β
ρw AR parameter wage markup β
ρep MA parameter price markup β
ρew MA parameter wage markup β
ρga Effect of tech shock on exog. demand N
σc Std dev. of risk premium shock Γ−1
σw Std dev. of wage markup shock Γ−1
σp Std dev. of price markup shock Γ−1
σr Std dev. of interest rate shock Γ−1
σa Std dev. of technology shock Γ−1
σi Std dev. of investment shock Γ−1
σg Std dev. of exog. demand shock Γ−1
Notes: The prior for a parameter is a normal (N), beta (β), gamma (Γ), or inverse-gamma (Γ−1
tribution, and the ﬁnal three columns report the posterior mean and lower and upper limits o2.5. An alternative model
To isolate the effects of borrowing constraints on the business cycle,
we estimate two versions of ourmodel: themodel presented above, and
an alternative model where entrepreneurs are identical to households
in terms of their rate of time preference and thus do not face borrowing
constraints. This alternative is essentially the model put forward by
Smets and Wouters (2007).
3. Bayesian estimation
The following seven observables are used to estimate the two ver-
sions of the model: the growth rates of GDP, aggregate consumption,
and investment; real wages; inﬂation; the short-term nominal interest
rate; and hours worked. Given that we have seven stochastic shocks in
the model, we avoid stochastic singularity. The data used to estimate
the models are described in Appendix B. We denote ‘aggregate’ con-
sumption as Ca since it corresponds to the sum of household and entre-
preneurial consumption in our model. As in Justiniano et al. (2010),
consumption corresponds to private consumption of non-durable
goods, while investment is deﬁned as the sum of gross domestic private
investment and consumption of durable goods. The models are
estimated using standard Bayesian techniques. For the most part the
priors for the model are the same as those employed by Smets and
Wouters. There are two innocuous caveats to this statement. First, we
use a Gamma prior instead of a Normal prior for the labour-disutility954Q3–2011Q4.
Mean Std dev. Mean (5%) (95%)
0.300 0.050 0.275 0.212 0.340
4.000 1.500 2.579 1.612 3.516
1.500 0.375 1.033 0.979 1.087
1.500 0.375 1.322 0.779 1.845
0.700 0.100 0.905 0.875 0.937
0.700 0.100 0.811 0.750 0.873
0.500 0.100 0.875 0.819 0.937
2.000 0.750 0.821 0.382 1.214
0.500 0.100 0.872 0.833 0.909
0.500 0.150 0.304 0.192 0.411
1.250 0.125 1.297 1.202 1.393
0.500 0.150 0.391 0.213 0.567
0.500 0.150 0.193 0.082 0.298
1.500 0.250 1.899 1.619 2.187
0.750 0.100 0.853 0.818 0.889
0.125 0.050 0.074 0.044 0.106
0.125 0.050 0.245 0.210 0.282
0.625 0.100 0.835 0.734 0.943
0.250 0.100 0.250 0.092 0.398
0.500 0.150 0.510 0.322 0.709
1.000 0.500 0.985 0.222 1.717
0.000 2.000 −0.580 −2.628 1.504
0.400 0.100 0.470 0.443 0.495
0.500 0.200 0.970 0.960 0.982
0.500 0.200 0.866 0.827 0.904
0.500 0.200 0.990 0.982 0.997
0.500 0.200 0.192 0.123 0.264
0.500 0.200 0.134 0.051 0.212
0.500 0.200 0.945 0.906 0.982
0.500 0.200 0.957 0.928 0.988
0.500 0.200 0.888 0.818 0.954
0.500 0.200 0.934 0.897 0.972
0.500 0.200 0.359 0.280 0.434
0.100 2.000 0.387 0.341 0.430
0.100 2.000 0.258 0.230 0.285
0.100 2.000 0.141 0.122 0.160
0.100 2.000 0.216 0.197 0.236
0.100 2.000 0.548 0.501 0.592
0.100 2.000 2.199 1.807 2.610
0.100 2.000 0.344 0.315 0.373
) distribution. Columns 4 and 5 indicate the mean and standard deviation of the prior dis-
f 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals from the posterior distribution.
Table 2
Estimation results for parameters and shock processes of model without borrowing constraints: 1954Q3–2011Q4.
Parameter Description Prior Mean Std dev. Mean (5%) (95%)
α Share of capital N 0.300 0.050 0.126 0.055 0.198
ϕ Investment adjustment cost parameter N 4.000 1.500 4.882 3.235 6.548
σc Households intertemporal elasticity N 1.500 0.375 1.358 1.205 1.499
h Habit parameter of consumers β 0.700 0.100 0.759 0.686 0.826
θw Calvo wage parameter β 0.500 0.100 0.811 0.751 0.876
σl Labour disutility parameter Γ 2.000 0.750 1.363 0.644 2.125
θp Calvo price parameter β 0.500 0.100 0.765 0.716 0.818
ξ Capacity utilization parameter β 0.500 0.150 0.711 0.567 0.840
ϕp Markup (goods) N 1.250 0.125 1.291 1.195 1.381
δw Wage indexation β 0.500 0.150 0.576 0.385 0.765
δp Price indexation β 0.500 0.150 0.225 0.111 0.334
ϕπ Taylor rule inﬂation N 1.500 0.250 1.896 1.660 2.124
ϕr Taylor rule lagged interest rate β 0.750 0.100 0.797 0.759 0.836
ϕx Taylor rule output gap N 0.125 0.050 0.076 0.049 0.103
ϕΔx Taylor rule output gap growth rate N 0.125 0.05 0.211 0.171 0.251
π Steady state inﬂation Γ 0.625 0.100 0.871 0.768 0.975
100ð1−βÞ
β
Discount rate (percent) Γ 0.250 0.100 0.245 0.090 0.380
lss Log steady state hours N 0.000 2.000 −0.538 −2.400 1.327
γ Steady state growth rate (percent) N 0.400 0.100 0.450 0.420 0.482
ρa AR parameter technology shock β 0.500 0.200 0.981 0.971 0.989
ρc AR parameter risk premium shock β 0.500 0.200 0.507 0.365 0.647
ρg AR parameter exogenous demand shock β 0.500 0.200 0.986 0.978 0.994
ρi AR parameter investment shock β 0.500 0.200 0.695 0.611 0.783
ρr AR parameter interest rate β 0.500 0.200 0.256 0.152 0.367
ρp AR parameter price markup β 0.500 0.200 0.964 0.942 0.985
ρw AR parameter wage markup β 0.500 0.200 0.962 0.941 0.986
ρep MA parameter price markup β 0.500 0.200 0.820 0.744 0.910
ρew MA parameter wage markup β 0.500 0.200 0.921 0.882 0.962
ρga Effect of tech shock on exog. demand N 0.500 0.200 0.256 0.192 0.323
σc Std dev. of risk premium shock Γ−1 0.100 2.000 1.427 0.801 1.974
σw Std dev. of wage markup shock Γ−1 0.100 2.000 0.261 0.234 0.289
σp Std dev. of price markup shock Γ−1 0.100 2.000 0.121 0.100 0.142
σr Std dev. of interest rate shock Γ−1 0.100 2.000 0.210 0.192 0.228
σa Std dev. of technology shock Γ−1 0.100 2.000 0.565 0.518 0.615
σi Std dev. of investment shock Γ−1 0.100 2.000 0.967 0.836 1.109
σg Std dev. of exog. demand shock Γ−1 0.100 2.000 0.320 0.294 0.344
Notes: The prior for a parameter is a normal (N), beta (β), gamma (Γ), or inverse-gamma (Γ−1) distribution. Columns 4 and 5 indicate the mean and standard deviation of the prior
distribution, and the ﬁnal three columns report the posterior mean and lower and upper limits of 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals from the posterior distribution.
Table 3
Log marginal data densities.
Models
575G. Kamber et al. / Economic Modelling 51 (2015) 571–582parameter, σl, though with the same mean and variance used in Smets
and Wouters.6 Second, we estimate the household's discount rate
using a Gamma prior with a mean of 0.25 and a standard deviation of
0.1, though the data are found to be somewhat uninformative for
these priors. Other authors such as Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) calibrate this parameter directly.
The model with borrowing constraints has two parameters without
analogues in the original Smets–Wouters model: (i) the loan-to-value
ratio, χ, and (ii) the gap between the discount rates of the households
and entrepreneurs, ~β . Given that the LVR is a device to ensure that
entrepreneur's have equity in their investment ventures, the LVR is
assumed to fall within (0,1). More speciﬁcally the prior for the LVR is
a Beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.15.
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) calibrate the LVR to be 0.85, suggesting that
it is difﬁcult to estimate without data on debt and housing holdings of
credit-constrained households. Our mean posterior parameter esti-
mates for the LVR are close to our prior value of 0.51, but the data are
somewhat informative, indicating that the probability mass should be
more tightly grouped around the mean value. When taking the model
to a shortened data sample, ending before the beginning of the Great
Recession, we obtain a posterior mean of 0.54 for the same prior.
The prior distribution for the discount rate gap, ~β, is a Gamma distri-
bution with a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 0.5. This prior dis-
tribution implicitly encompasses the calibrated discount factors for
impatient borrowers used in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), which range from 0.98 to 0.97. Gerali et al. (2010) estimate a6 In estimation over a smaller sub-sample, positive probability mass was assigned to
negative parameter values, which we rule out on a priori theoretical grounds.similar model, but do not attempt to estimate either χ or ~β. Iacoviello
provides greater discussion of plausible discount factors, and cites a
number of papers on cross-sectional variation in discount factors
(Carroll and Samwick, 1997, for example, suggest that the plausible
range for discount factors is between 0.91 and 0.99). While our prior
range does not fully encompass this cross-sectional variation we think
it provides a sufﬁciently broad range for what one might assume is
the average impatient entrepreneur.
Finally, we calibrate the depreciation rate to 0.025 and the share of
government spending in GDP to 0.22. Following Smets and Wouters
(2007), we set the Kimball aggregator parameters, ϵp and ϵw, to 10 and
calibrate the steady state wage mark-up to 1.5.
Tables 1 and 2 report the posteriormean and 90%posterior probabil-
ity intervals for the structural parameters and the standard deviations of
the shocks for themodelwith andwithout collateral constraints. The re-
ported parameter estimates for the models are based on 900,000 draws
of Markov chains. ‘Trace-plots’ of deciles from the two Markov chains
are available from the authors upon request.
The posterior estimates for the common structural parameters in the
two models are broadly similar. They suggest a high degree of nominal
price and wage rigidity, a signiﬁcant degree of habit persistence andNo borrowing constraint Borrowing constraint
Modiﬁed harmonic mean −1342.001 −1413.831
Laplace approximation −1340.979 −1413.943
Table 4
Variance decomposition of model without borrowing constraints: 1954Q3–2011Q4.
Risk premium Wage markup Price markup Monetary policy Neutral technology IST Government
Output growth 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.55 0.11
[0.03, 0.18] [0.01, 0.06] [0.02, 0.07] [0.04, 0.08] [0.06, 0.12] [0.43, 0.65] [0.09, 0.14]
Consumption growth 0.38 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.01
[0.22, 0.56] [0.06, 0.21] [0.02, 0.11] [0.11, 0.21] [0.07, 0.16] [0.03, 0.21] [0.00, 0.02]
Investment growth 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.0 0.03 0.91 0.00
[0.00, 0.03] [0.00, 0.02] [0.01, 0.04] [0.01, 0.02] [0.02, 0.04] [0.87, 0.95] [0.00, 0.00]
Real wage growth 0.01 0.60 0.28 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.00
[0.00, 0.01] [0.51, 0.70] [0.20, 0.39] [0.00, 0.01] [0.04, 0.09] [0.02, 0.07] [0.00, 0.00]
Total hours growth 0.03 0.32 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.31 0.09
[0.01, 0.07] [0.16, 0.47] [0.07, 0.27] [0.02, 0.06] [0.02, 0.05] [0.17, 0.44] [0.03, 0.13]
Inﬂation 0.01 0.40 0.38 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.01
[0.00, 0.03] [0.25, 0.55] [0.22, 0.52] [0.02, 0.07] [0.04, 0.09] [0.02, 0.16] [0.00, 0.01]
Interest rate 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.43 0.01
[0.01, 0.17] [0.08, 0.26] [0.03, 0.15] [0.07, 0.17] [0.06, 0.13] [0.27, 0.62] [0.01, 0.02]
Notes: Each column corresponds to the contribution of a particular structural shock to the variance of observables. The values in square brackets are 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals.
576 G. Kamber et al. / Economic Modelling 51 (2015) 571–582sluggish investment adjustment. Differences between the two models
arise primarily in the size and persistence of investment and risk premi-
um shocks. In the presence of borrowing constraints, investment shocks
become more volatile but less persistent. Risk premium shocks, how-
ever, are estimated to be less volatile but more persistent. Introducing
borrowing constraints also lowers the mean of the posterior estimates
of the capital utilization and investment adjustment cost parameters,
relative to the model without borrowing constraints.
The additional structure thatwe have introducedwith the two agent
types and the borrowing constraint has come at a cost. Like Brzoza-
Brzezina and Kolasa (2013), we ﬁnd that empirical ﬁt is adversely af-
fected by the introduction of the borrowing constraint. Estimates of
the (log) marginal data densities of the models with and without the
borrowing constraint are reported in Table 3.7 The modiﬁed harmonic
mean estimate is based on an average of the draws from the Markov
chains, and the Laplace estimate is based on a second order approxima-
tion of that log marginal data density (which approximates the data
density using a Normal distribution). Bayes factors can be computed
from these logmarginal data densities, which can then be used to com-
pare the twomodels (Kass and Raftery, 1995). Kass and Raftery's guide-
lines to assess the log Bayes factor imply that the data strongly support
the model without the borrowing constraint.8
What we demonstrate below is that IST shocks are incompatible
with borrowing constraints, as implemented in the model. However,
to explain ﬁnancial frictions empirically, alternative structural assump-
tions are needed, or additional features are required to rehabilitate the
model with borrowing constraints.
4. IST and risk premium shocks and the business cycle
This section analyses the key drivers of the business cycle by looking
at the variance decomposition of the observables in both version of the
model. Table 4 reports the contribution of each structural shock to the
volatility of the observables for the version of the model without the
borrowing constraint. The dominant role of IST shocks highlighted by
Justiniano et al. (2010) is replicated in this version of the model as 55%
of the variance of output growth is accounted for by IST shocks. Risk pre-
mium, neutral technology and government spending shocks jointly
make up another 30% of the variance of output growth. IST shocks also
account for almost all (91%) of the variance of investment growth and
a large part of the variance of the nominal interest rate (43%).
In this model IST shocks are particularly important in capturing
the decline in output that occurred during the Great Recession. Fig. 17 See also Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013).
8 If 2 loge(B01) N 10 then the evidence is considered to be ‘very strong’ in favour ofmodel
0, where B01 is themarginal data density of model zero divided by themarginal data den-
sity of model one.shows the path of output growth when the model is driven solely by
IST shocks. Here, IST shocks account for over half of the drop in output
growth during the last recession. The premise of our paper is that this
result is not robust to the introduction of ﬁnancial frictions in the form
of borrowing constraints.
Introducing a borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs affects the trans-
mission mechanism of IST shocks and thus their relative contribution to
the volatility of GDP. The variance decomposition of the observables in
Table 5 illustrates that in the model with borrowing constraints, the role
of IST shocks is greatly reduced. Apart from consumption and investment,
IST shocks account for less than 5% of the volatility of the observable
variables. Their contribution to the dynamics of investment remains
signiﬁcant but almost two thirds less than in the model without the bor-
rowing constraint. The higher share of IST shocks in the volatility of con-
sumption reﬂects these shocks' role in the dynamics of entrepreneurial
consumption. In Section 4.1, we examine this channel in more detail.
In themodel with the borrowing constraint, themain driver of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations appears to be the risk premium, contributing be-
tween 39% and 47% to the variance of the components of GDP. Adding a
borrowing constraint also increases the share of risk premium shocks in
the variance of total hours and nominal interest rates.
Given its importance in shaping business cycle dynamics, we now
examine how the risk premium shock evolves over the business cycle.
Fig. 2 plots the posterior mean of our estimated risk premium shock
and the NBER recession dates which start at the peak of a business
cycle and end at the trough. The sample includes every recession from
the late 1950s onwards. There is a striking conformity of the risk premi-
um shock with these recessions. At the beginning of each recession the
estimated risk premium shock rises sharply, implying that the effective
interest rate in the model is highly countercyclical. Moreover, the risk
premium and the effective interest rate start to rise before the peak of
the boom, in almost every recession in our sample.
The increase in our measure of the risk premium shock is most pro-
nounced during the last recession. Fig. 3 illustrates the role of risk pre-
mium shocks over the last decade and a half by simulating the path of
output assuming that the model is only driven by the estimated risk
premium shock. Most of the drop in output growth in the last recession
is due to the variation in the risk premium shock. This is in line with the
observation that the last recession was driven by sharp disruptions in
the ﬁnancial system resulting in higher interest rate spreads.
4.1. IST shocks and collateral constraints
The following two sections ﬂesh out the intuition behind our results
startingwith the role of IST shocks. In a real business cycle typemodel, in-
vestment rises but consumption falls following a positive IST shock (see
for example Barro and King, 1984). A shock that increases the marginal
efﬁciency of investment raises the incentive to invest by more than can
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Fig. 1.Role of IST shock in theGreat Recession in themodelwithout borrowing constraints. Notes: The solid line labelleddata shows the year-on-year growth rate ofGDP. The solid-crossed
line, labelled IST shocks only, shows the growth rate of GDP that would have occurred if only the estimated IST shocks assume non-zero values. The estimated shocks are obtained via the
Kalman smoother on the estimated posterior mean of the Smets–Wouters model with no borrowing constraints.
Table 5
Variance decomposition of model with borrowing constraints: 1954Q3–2011Q4.
Risk premium Wage markup Price markup Monetary policy Neutral technology IST Government
Output growth 0.47 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.04 0.14
[0.43, 0.53] [0.03, 0.07] [0.02, 0.06] [0.18, 0.23] [0.03, 0.09] [0.01, 0.06] [0.12, 0.15]
Consumption growth 0.46 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.00
[0.40, 0.52] [0.03, 0.08] [0.02, 0.06] [0.16, 0.23] [0.02, 0.06] [0.14, 0.25] [0.00, 0.01]
Investment growth 0.39 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.37 0.00
[0.31, 0.48] [0.01, 0.04] [0.01, 0.06] [0.13, 0.21] [0.00, 0.02] [0.23, 0.50] [0.00, 0.00]
Real wage growth 0.01 0.81 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
[0.00, 0.02] [0.76, 0.87] [0.11, 0.19] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.03] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00]
Total hours 0.23 0.32 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.23
[0.12, 0.35] [0.14, 0.49] [0.01, 0.10] [0.04, 0.14] [0.02, 0.09] [0.00, 0.02] [0.10, 0.36]
Inﬂation 0.02 0.43 0.50 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
[0.00, 0.05] [0.28, 0.58] [0.35, 0.65] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.07] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00]
Interest rate 0.40 0.25 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.00
[0.25, 0.55] [0.14, 0.37] [0.07, 0.22] [0.06, 0.13] [0.07, 0.15] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00, 0.01]
Notes: Each column corresponds to the contribution of a particular structural shock to the variance of observables. The values in square brackets are 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals.
577G. Kamber et al. / Economic Modelling 51 (2015) 571–582be accommodated by an increase in labour effort. As a result, investment
can only increase sufﬁciently if consumption falls. This GDP-consumption
co-movement puzzle precludes IST shocks from being a key driver of the
business cycle in this type of model. Justiniano et al. (2010) show how
this co-movement puzzle can be overcome through a combination of
nominal and real rigidities plus variable capital utilization.9 As a result,
their model is able to generate a dominant role for IST shocks over the
business cycle, although these shocks have a limited role in accounting
for consumption movements. All the features that account for the co-
movement puzzle in Justiniano et al. are also present in our model, in
addition to the binding borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs.
Fig. 4 shows the impulse response functions following an IST shock
in our estimated model. The solid lines show the median response and
the shaded areas the 90% conﬁdence intervals. As Fig. 4 makes clear,9 Greenwood et al. (2000) and more recently Furlanetto and Seneca (2014) and Khan
and Tsoukalas (2011), discuss a number of ways in which the positive co-movement of
consumption and investment can be derived, including non-separable preferences, habit
persistence and factor immobility, intratemporal adjustment costs on investment, and in-
termediate inputs.there is no co-movement puzzle between GDP and household con-
sumption. However, aggregate consumption declines because of a
sharp adjustment to entrepreneurs' consumption in the wake of a
positive IST shock. A positive IST shock reduces the value of Tobin's q
(this is true even in a simple RBC model without adjustment costs
where 1= Qtεμ,t) and thus the value of the capital stock used for collat-
eral. The decline in the value of collateral, other things equal, reduces
the ﬁrm's ability to borrow just when the demand for borrowing com-
ing from investment is high. As a result, investment is reduced relative
to the case without borrowing constraints, and entrepreneurs' con-
sumption falls. In terms of the entrepreneur's Euler equation, (9), a de-
cline in Tobin's q tightens the borrowing constraint causing λte to rise,
which, other things equal, causes entrepreneurial consumption to fall.
In the estimated model entrepreneurs' consumption falls by enough to
lead to a decline in aggregate consumption.
4.2. Risk premium shocks and borrowing constraints
The volatilities of observed variables ultimately stem from some un-
derlying structural shocks. In the context of the model with borrowing
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Fig. 2. The risk-premium shock and NBER recession intervals in the model with borrowing constraints. Notes: The solid line shows the estimated risk premium shocks for themodel with
the borrowing constraint. The estimated shocks are obtained via the Kalman smoother on the estimated posterior mean. The shaded areas correspond to the NBER recession intervals.
578 G. Kamber et al. / Economic Modelling 51 (2015) 571–582constraints, the risk premium shocks supplant investment shocks. The
same channel that reduces the impact of IST shocks contributes to
the increase in the importance of risk premium shocks. Fig. 5
shows the transmission mechanism of a risk premium shock. A neg-
ative risk premium shock lowers the effective interest rates faced by
household and entrepreneurs. This results in higher consumption
and output, generating an increased demand for investment and a
higher price of capital. From the perspective of entrepreneurs, even
in the absence of any borrowing constraint, the lower cost of servic-
ing their debt allows them to increase both their consumption and
capital purchases.1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
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Fig. 3.Role of risk premium shock in theGreat Recession in themodelwith borrowing constrain
crossed line, labelled Risk premium shocks only, shows the growth rate of GDP thatwould have o
shocks are obtained via the Kalman smoother on the estimated posterior mean of the model wThe additional asset price channel (higher Tobin's q) implies that
they also face a looser borrowing constraint (both λte and εc,t decline in
Eq. (9) causing entrepreneurial consumption to rise). This engenders
an ampliﬁcation of the impact of risk premium shocks for both, con-
sumption and investment. As the response of interest rates and inﬂation
are positive, our model generates positive co-movement between mac-
roeconomic aggregates following a risk premium shock.
Our analysis shows that the introduction of the borrowing constraint
alters the transmissionmechanisms of both IST and risk premium shocks.
The borrowing constraint attenuates the expansionary effects of IST
shocks onoutput,whereas the impact of riskpremiumshocks is ampliﬁed.2006 2008 2010 2012
Data
Risk premium shock only
ts. Notes: The solid line labelled data shows the year-on-year growth rate of GDP. The solid-
ccurred if only the estimated risk premium shocks assume non-zero values. The estimated
ith the borrowing constraint.
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Fig. 4. Impulse response to an IST shock in themodel with borrowing constraints. Notes: The solid lines are impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock. The solid line is
the posterior median, the shaded areas correspond to the 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals. Responses are measured as the percentage deviations from trend except for inﬂation and
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Fig. 5. Impulse response to a risk premium shock in the model with borrowing constraints. Notes: The solid lines are impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock. The
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Our analysis suggests that risk premium shocks, or shocks to the ef-
fective interest rate faced by households and ﬁrms, are the main driver
of the business cycle. This result is attributable to the role played by sim-
ple ﬁnancial frictions in the form of borrowing constraints. An expan-
sionary risk premium shock loosens the borrowing constraint faced
by entrepreneurs and thus reduces the cost of transforming household
savings into productive capital.
Justiniano et al. (2011), in a model without explicit ﬁnancial fric-
tions, attribute this role to IST shocks. A positive IST shock raises the
marginal efﬁciency of investment and thus the rate with which house-
hold savings are transformed into productive capital. As a supply type
shock, a positive IST shock also yields a decline in the price of capital.
In the presence of borrowing constraints, the counter-cyclical asset
price movement tends to tighten the borrowing constraint and this
mechanism reduces the contribution of IST shocks.
Christensen and Dib (2008), andmore recently Merola (2015) com-
pare models with and without a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism,
where ﬁrms' net worth affects the ‘external ﬁnance premium’ and
thus the ﬁrms' costs of borrowing. Even though there are signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between their approach and ours (in terms of sample period,
model and estimation technique), they too ﬁnd that the role of IST
shocks in the forecast variance of GDP diminishes in the presence of
ﬁnancial frictions, albeit to a much lesser extent. The ﬁnancial friction
in Christensen and Dib (2008) has a mild effect on the transmissionTable 6
Estimation results for parameters and shock processes of model with borrowing constraints: 1
Parameter Description Prior
α Share of capital N
ϕ Investment adjustment cost parameter N
σc Households intertemporal elasticity N
σcE Entrepreneur's intertemporal elasticity N
h habit parameter of consumers β
hE habit parameter of entrepreneurs β
θw Calvo wage parameter β
σl Labour disutility parameter Γ
θp Calvo price parameter β
ξ Capacity utilization parameter β
ϕp Markup (goods) N
δw Wage indexation β
δp Price indexation β
ϕπ Taylor rule inﬂation N
ϕr Taylor rule lagged interest rate β
ϕx Taylor rule output gap N
ϕΔx Taylor rule output gap growth rate N
π Steady state inﬂation Γ
100ð1−βÞ
β
Discount rate (percent) Γ
ltv Loan to value ratio β
~β Entrepreneurs discount less households Γ
lss Log steady state hours N
γ Steady state growth rate (percent) N
ρa AR parameter technology shock β
ρc AR parameter risk premium shock β
ρg AR parameter exog. demand shock β
ρi AR parameter investment shock β
ρr AR parameter interest rate β
ρp AR parameter price markup β
ρw AR parameter wage markup β
ρep MA parameter price markup β
ρew MA parameter wage markup β
ρga Effect of tech shock on exog. demand N
σc Std dev. of risk premium shock Γ−1
σw Std dev. of wage markup shock Γ−1
σp Std dev. of price markup shock Γ−1
σr Std dev. of interest rate shock Γ−1
σa Std dev. of technology shock Γ−1
σi Std dev. of investment shock Γ−1
σg Std dev. of exog. demand shock Γ−1
Notes: The prior for a parameter is a normal (N), beta (β), gamma (Γ), or inverse-gamma (Γ−1
tribution, and the ﬁnal three columns report the posterior mean and lower and upper limits omechanism quantitatively, but the dynamics are qualitatively un-
changed. In our model, ﬁnancial frictions reverse the short term impact
of IST shocks on aggregate consumption, and thus have both quantita-
tive and qualitative effects on the response of output.
A number of recent papers in the literature view theﬁnancial sector as
a source of shocks driving the business cycle. For example, Nolan and
Thoenissen (2009) show in a Bernanke et al. (1999) type model that
shocks to entrepreneurial net worth play a key role in the dynamics of
GDP. Christiano et al. (2014) estimates a modiﬁed ﬁnancial accelerator
modelwhere the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks in the ﬁnancial acceler-
ator mechanism is treated as a stochastic process. This risk shock is
shown to account for a large proportion of the volatility of GDP when
the model is estimated on ﬁnancial data. As in our analysis, the contribu-
tion of investment shocks declines, once risk shocks are introduced.
Hirakata et al. (2011) also introduce shocks to ﬁnancial intermediation
in a BGG-type model and ﬁnd shocks to ﬁnancial intermediation play
an important role in the dynamics of investment, in particular accounting
for the collapse of investment during the ﬁnancial crisis. Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) investigate the importance of shocks originating in the
ﬁnancial sectorwhenﬁrms face borrowing constraints. As in the previous
literature, theseﬁnancial shocks are found to be quantitatively important.
In relation to this literature, our results highlight the importance of
risk premium shocks. Although this type of shock is present in canonical
DSGE models such as Smets and Wouters (2007), its role as a driver
of the business cycle only comes to the fore once we introduce the
borrowing constraint. In contrast to Christiano et al. (2014), our risk954Q3–2006Q4.
Mean Std dev Mean (5%) (95%)
0.300 0.050 0.323 0.258 0.388
4.000 1.500 2.633 1.615 3.557
1.500 0.375 1.033 0.976 1.089
1.500 0.375 1.307 0.788 1.874
0.700 0.100 0.902 0.871 0.933
0.700 0.100 0.836 0.776 0.894
0.500 0.100 0.824 0.737 0.909
2.000 0.750 0.823 0.380 1.243
0.500 0.100 0.838 0.790 0.884
0.500 0.150 0.204 0.111 0.297
1.250 0.125 1.304 1.205 1.403
0.500 0.150 0.407 0.209 0.602
0.500 0.150 0.210 0.095 0.319
1.500 0.250 2.128 1.854 2.403
0.750 0.100 0.846 0.815 0.877
0.125 0.050 0.104 0.070 0.136
0.125 0.050 0.254 0.217 0.290
0.625 0.100 0.832 0.722 0.940
0.250 0.100 0.246 0.095 0.398
0.500 0.150 0.540 0.337 0.736
1.000 0.500 0.993 0.243 1.737
0.000 2.000 0.055 −1.932 1.946
0.400 0.100 0.486 0.457 0.513
0.500 0.200 0.964 0.952 0.978
0.500 0.200 0.814 0.756 0.875
0.500 0.200 0.987 0.979 0.996
0.500 0.200 0.203 0.128 0.275
0.500 0.200 0.096 0.025 0.162
0.500 0.200 0.947 0.914 0.982
0.500 0.200 0.957 0.927 0.986
0.500 0.200 0.881 0.815 0.946
0.500 0.200 0.916 0.871 0.964
0.500 0.200 0.383 0.308 0.459
0.100 2.000 0.419 0.361 0.476
0.100 2.000 0.252 0.221 0.282
0.100 2.000 0.134 0.115 0.154
0.100 2.000 0.213 0.191 0.232
0.100 2.000 0.545 0.497 0.591
0.100 2.000 2.259 1.824 2.664
0.100 2.000 0.332 0.300 0.362
) distribution. Columns 4 and 5 indicate the mean and standard deviation of the prior dis-
f 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals from the posterior distribution.
Table 7
Variance decomposition of model with borrowing constraints: 1954Q3–2006Q4.
Risk premium Wage markup Price markup Monetary policy Neutral technology IST Government
Output growth 0.48 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.12
[0.42, 0.53] [0.03, 0.07] [0.02, 0.06] [0.14, 0.19] [0.07, 0.14] [0.01, 0.07] [0.10, 0.13]
Consumption growth 0.45 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.20 0.00
[0.39, 0.52] [0.03, 0.10] [0.02, 0.07] [0.13, 0.18] [0.05, 0.10] [0.13, 0.25] [0.00, 0.01]
Investment growth 0.40 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.39 0.00
[0.30, 0.51] [0.01, 0.03] [0.01, 0.06] [0.10, 0.18] [0.01, 0.03] [0.22, 0.53] [0.00, 0.00]
Real wage growth 0.01 0.76 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
[0.00, 0.03] [0.68, 0.84] [0.12, 0.24] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.06] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00]
Total hours 0.16 0.45 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.19
[0.07, 0.25] [0.26, 0.63] [0.01, 0.10] [0.04, 0.10] [0.02, 0.09] [0.01, 0.02] [0.08, 0.30]
Inﬂation 0.01 0.45 0.49 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
[0.00, 0.03] [0.30, 0.60] [0.31, 0.63] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.07] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00]
Interest rate 0.32 0.29 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.00
[0.18, 0.45] [0.18, 0.40] [0.09, 0.28] [0.04, 0.10] [0.09, 0.18] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00, 0.01]
Notes: Each column corresponds to the contribution of a particular structural shock to the variance of observables. The values in square brackets are 90% Bayesian conﬁdence intervals.
Table 8
Linearized model equations.
GDP yt ¼ cay cat þ iy it þ zy zt þ εg;t
Marginal
utility c
λt ¼−σ c 11−hγ ðct−
h
γ ct−1Þ þ σ
c−1
1−hγ
ðWLCÞlt
Euler λt = Et(λt + 1 + rt + εc,t− πt + 1)
Marginal
utility ce
λet ¼−σe 11−heγ ðc
e
t−
h
γ c
e
t−1Þ
Entrepreneur's
Euler
λte = λt + 1e + υ(rt + εc,t− πt + 1) + (υ− 1)Δt
Borrowing
constraint
bt + rt + εc,t− πt + 1 = qt + 1 + kt
Entrep. ﬂow
constr.
ce
y c
e
t þ iy it ¼ by bt þ by RRγπ ðπt−bt−1−rt−1−εc;t−1Þ þ ðrkt þ kt−1Þrk ky 1γ
Consumption
agg.
ca
y c
a
t ¼ cy ct þ c
e
y c
e
t
Investment it ¼ 11þβeγ1−σe it−1 þ ð1− 11þβeγ1−σe Þitþ1 þ 11þβeγ1−σe γ2ϕ qt þ εμ;t
Tobin's q qt ¼ ðð1−δÞβeγ−σ e þ ΔχÞqtþ1 þ ð1−ð1−δÞβeγ−σ e−ΔχÞrktþ1
þΔχΔt þ λetþ1−λet
Production fn. yt ¼ ϕ F ðαkt þ ð1−αÞlt þ εa;tÞ
Effective capital kt ¼ kt−1 þ zt
Capital
utilization
zt ¼ 1−ξξ rkt
Capital
accumulation
kt ¼ 1−δγ kt−1 þ ð1− 1−δγ Þit þ ð1− 1−δγ Þð1þ βeγ1−σ
eγ2ϕÞεμ;t
Marginal cost mct = (α)rkt + (1− α)wt− εa,t
Wage mark up μwt ¼ wt−ðσ l lt þ 11−hγ ðct−
h
γ ct−1Þ
Cost
minimization
rkt ¼−ðkt−ltÞ þwt
Price inﬂation πt ¼ δp1þβγ1−σc δp πt−1 þ
βγ1−σc
1þβγ1−σc δp πtþ1
þð1−βγ1−σ
c θp
1þβγ1−σc δp Þ
1−θp
ðθpððϕp−1Þεpþ1ÞÞmct þ εp;t
Wage inﬂation wt ¼ 11þβγ1−σc wt−1 þ ð1− 11þβγ1−σc Þðwtþ1 þ πtþ1Þ−
1þβγ1−σc δw
1þβγ1−σc πt
þ δw
1þβγ1−σc πt−1−
1−βγ1−σc θw
1þβγ1−σc
1−θw
θw ðϕw−1Þð ϵwþ1 μ
w
t þ εw;t
Interest rate
rule
rt ¼ ϕr rt−1 þ ð1−ϕrÞðϕππt þ ϕxðyt−yflext ÞÞ
þϕdxðyt−yt−1−ðyflext −yflext−1ÞÞ þ εr;t
Note that Δ is the steady state value of the shadow price on the borrowing constraint; υ ¼
βγ−σc =ðβEγ−σ cE Þ; and Δt is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
581G. Kamber et al. / Economic Modelling 51 (2015) 571–582premium shock becomes important in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions
without using ﬁnancial data in the estimation of the model. Amano and
Shukayev (2012) alsoﬁnd that risk premium shocks play a key role, and
are particularly important in driving an economy towards the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Our results share some similarities with Iacoviello (2005), who points
out that, in amodel with real estate investments, the effects of borrowing
constraints on the ampliﬁcation of shocks depend on the response of
asset prices and consumer price inﬂation. In his framework,where house-
hold debt is denominated in nominal terms, shocks that generate a nega-
tive correlation between inﬂation and output (such as supply shocks),
are decelerated while the impact of demand shocks are ampliﬁed. Our
contribution extends this channel to the case of investment shocks.
6. Robustness over the sample
This section analyses the robustness of our results to alternative
sample periods. Our baseline estimation period runs from 1954Q3
through to 2011Q4 and therefore encompasses the estimation periods
of, amongst others, Justiniano et al. (2010, 2011) and Smets and
Wouters (2007). This estimation period spans at least two recent epi-
sodes that have the potential to affect our results: the Financial Crisis
and the post 2009Q1 period where the zero lower bound for the federal
funds rate becomes binding. To check for the robustness of our results,
we re-estimate the model for the 1954Q3 to 2006Q4 period.
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimation results and variance decompo-
sition for this alternative sample. Our parameter estimates are broadly
consistent with those obtained in the baseline estimation, suggesting
that our results are not unduly driven by the ﬁnancial crisis or the
zero lower bound period.
The main conclusion regarding the drivers of the business cycle
remains unchanged. In the context of the model with borrowing con-
straints, the risk premium shock remains the dominant driver of the
volatility in the components of GDP.
7. Conclusion
At the heart of our paper is an identiﬁcation problem that affects the
interpretation of the key drivers of the business cycle. We demonstrate
that the introduction of ﬁnancial frictions materially alters which shocks
are thought to be themost important drivers of the business cycle.When
entrepreneurs are subject to binding collateral constraints, a reduction in
the value of installed capital reduces the value of collateral and thus the
amount an entrepreneur can borrow. We ﬁnd that the dynamic re-
sponses of output and consumption to a positive investment shock are
materially altered by such collateral constraints. While an investment
shock promptsmore investment and positive output growth, the behav-
iour of consumption is completely altered, since the impact effect is forconsumption to fall. The investment shock causes collateral values to de-
cline, which reduces entrepreneurs' ability to obtain external ﬁnance.
Thus, to increase investment entrepreneurs are forced to reduce their
consumption. Investment shocks can then no longer generate the posi-
tive co-movement that is evident between consumption and investment.
Instead, in the model with collateral constraints, risk premium shocks
increase markedly in importance, whereas shocks to investment have a
much diminished role, contributing only 4% of the variation in output.Appendix A. Linearized model
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B.1. Data sourcesTable 9
Raw data.
Mnemonic Source Description
GDP Haver Gross domestic product (SAAR, Bil.$)
JGDP Haver Gross domestic product: chain price index (SA, 2005 = 100)
CN Haver Personal consump. expend.: Nondurable Goods (SAAR, Bil.$)
CS Haver Personal consump. expend.: services (SAAR, Bil.$)
CD Haver Personal consump. expend.: durable goods (SAAR, Bil.$)
I Haver Gross private domestic investment (SAAR, Bil.$)
LF Haver Civilian labor force: 16 yr + (SA, Thous)
LH Haver Not in the labor force: 16 yr + (SA, Thous)
LXNFC Haver Nonfarm business sector: compensation/hour (SA, 2005= 100)
LXNFH Haver Nonfarm business sector: hours of all persons (SA, 2005= 100)
FFED Haver Federal funds [effective] rate (% p.a.)
Note: The Haver mnemonics should be sufﬁxedwith @USECON to call the series from the
Haver Excel add-in.B.2. Data transformations
We transform the data as described in Justiniano et al.'s Investment
shocks and business cycles: technical appendix and additional results,
with a minor exception relating to nonfarm labour hours (discussed
below). The mnemonics from Table 9 are used in the right hand side
in Table 10.
For per capita labour hours we use the LXNFH series instead of the
HNFBN series reported by Justiniano et al. because the latter series no
longer seems to be available in Haver. LXNFH is an index with a base
year in 2005. We normalize our series to replicate the properties of
the series in Justiniano et al.10 In their sample ln(HNFBN/(LF+ LH)) ap-
pears to have has been normalized to zero. The federal funds rate is
divided by 4 because the model is run on quarterly data. No other de-
meaning or de-trending is performed on the data.Table 10
Data transformations.
Real GDP per capita = GDP/((LH+ LF) × JGDP)
Real consumption per capita = (CN+ CS)/((LH+ LF) × JGDP)
Investment per capita = (CD+ I)/((LH+ LF) × JGDP)
Real wages = ln(LXNFC/JGDP)
Inﬂation at time t= 100 × ln(JGDPt/JGDPt − 1)
Interest rate = FFED/4
Labour hours per capita = ln(LXNFH/(LF+ LH)) × 100
Notes: The observables for real GDP per capita, real consumption per
capita, real investment per capita, and real wages are computed as
100 times the log difference of each of the series described above,
i.e. the log approximation of quarterly percent changes.References
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